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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND INDOLENCE.

DL

WHETHER THE ACTS OF THE PARTIES CONSTITUTE
A MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE IN THE FENCE AS A BOUNDARY
IS A QUESTION OF LAW.

III.

WHETHER THE ACTS OF THE PARTIES CONSTITUTE
A MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE IN THE FENCE AS A
BOUNDARY IS A QUESTION OF LAW.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND INDOLENCE.

Appellee attempts to show that the trial court refused to find indolence. As stated in
Appellant's Brief, the court did use the word indolence. In fact, the court specifically
ordered the findings of fact and conclusions of law to include a finding that the Babcock
and their predecessor did not prevent or interrupt the usage of the property by Wilkinson.
(September Transcript, p. 14-15). The court also made it clear that he was not finding that
the parties entered into any type of agreement on the use of the property. (September
Transcript p.8-9).
It is clear from the court's bench ruling and subsequent statements that the
court found that there was an existing fence, which is referred to by the court as a

4

containment fence and that Wilkinson used the property enclosed by that fence for raising
of crops and the grazing of cattle. Babcock and her predecessors did not disallow or
interrupt that use by Wilkinson. The court referred to the inaction of Babcock as indolence
and concluded that Babcock's failure to take actions to kick the Wilkinson off of the
disputed property constituted indolence and an acquiescence in the Wilkinson' use of the
disputed property.
The court concluded that when the containment fence was first put, by Babcock's
predecessor, Williams, the true boundary line was known. The fence was placed because of
the land topography and convenience. (Bench ruling, page 1, Appendix A; June 24, 1998
hearing transcript, page 28, lines 15 through 22). The court found that the fence was
originally not intended as a boundary line, but was a fence of convenience. (June 24, 1998
hearing transcript, page 29, lines 12 through 13). Babcock, in her argument before the court
contended that the second element of "mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary" must
be interpreted to mean that the parties intended the fence to be a boundary as opposed to a
fence or line evidencing the parties occupation and use of the land. (June 24, 1998 hearing
transcript, page 13, lines 3 through 8). This definition is contrary to the law in the State of
Utah.
As previously discussed, this doctrine was discussed in the case of Carter v. Hanrath
885 P.2d 801 (Utah App. 1994). Carter was then reversed on appeal by the Utah Supreme
Court because of a lack of access to the disputed property. 925 P2d 960 (Utah 1996).
5

However, the language used by the Court of Appeals defining acquiescence is applicable.
The Court of Appeals in Carter embellished upon and defined some of the requirements set
forth in Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990). In discussing occupation, the court
stated, that the land must be occupied to a visible line and normal and appropriate use made
of the disputed parcel. In discussing the requirement of acquiescence the Court stated,
. . . that the actual knowledge of the fence or monument
marking the disputed boundary line is not a prerequisite in
boundary-by-acquiescence cases...."
Id at 805.
The Court went on to say,
.. .'[acquiescence' is more nearly synonymous with indolence,'
or 'consent by silence,'--or a knowledge that a fence or other
monuments appears to be a boundary,-but that no one did
anything about it. Lane v. Walker. 29 Utah 2d 119, 505 P.2d
1199, 1200 (1973). This accords with the dictionary definition
of acquiescence as [p]assive compliance or satisfaction . . .
[conduct from which assent may be reasonably inferred. . . .
Equivalent to assent inferred from silence with knowledge or
from encouragement, and presupposes knowledge and assent.
Black's Law Dictionary 24 (6th ed. 1990).

. . .Moreover, our holding that acquiescence may be imputed
from long-term indolence is consistent with the policy upon
which boundary by acquiescence is based, namely 'that the
peace and good order of society require that there be stability .
. . in the ownership of lands. . . . [B]oundary lines which have
been long established and accepted by those who should be
concerned should be left undisturbed in order to leave at rest
matters which may have resulted in controversy and litigation.'
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I d at 806. (quoting James Backman, The Law of Practical Location of Boundaries and the
Need for an Adverse Possession Remedy, 1986 Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co., Utah 2d
421,425,511 P.2d 145,147 (1973) B.Y.U. L. Rev. 957,965 (1986); (quoting Olsen v. Park
Daughters Inv. Co.. Utah 2d 421, 425, 511 P.2d 145, 147 (1973)).
Babcock contends that acquiescence in the Wilkinson's use of the property inside of
the fence cannot constitute a boundary line by acquiescence unless the fence originally was
intended to establish a boundary line. Clearly, that is in error. Wilkinson contends that the
acquiescence in the use of the property enclosed by the fence line regardless of the purpose
of the installation of the fence constitutes an acquiescence in a boundary which after a long
period of time establishes the boundary line between the adjoining property owners. This
is precisely the situation in the case at bar. The Babcocks have done nothing about the use
of the property by the Wilkinsons despite knowing a different monument may be the
boundary and without any agreement with the Wilkinson. Given these findings, the
Appellant has met the elements of boundary by acquiescence.

WHETHER THE ACTS OF THE PARTIES CONSTITUTE
A MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE IN THE FENCE AS A BOUNDARY
IS A QUESTION OF LAW.
Babcock next argues that the Appellant has not or cannot challenge the trial court's
conclusion that there was no mutual acquiescence. Such an argument ignores the issues
raised by the Appellant throughout this litigation. Appellant has consistently argued that the
7

facts in this case, as discussed above, fulfill the legal requirements for mutual acquiescence
as defined in Carter, Olsen and Staker.
Babcock attempts to further confuse the issue by claiming that mutual acquiescence
is a factual, instead of a legal conclusion. This is an interesting position since Babcock's
first issue and its level of review under his Statement of Issues, is that "establishing mutual
acquiescence in the fence as a boundary" presents a question of law. Nevertheless, whether
the facts and circumstances of this case amount to a mutual acquiescence, as defined by
appropriate case law, is an application of facts to law, regardless of its categorization by the
Appellee, and should be reviewed for correctness. The characterization by the Appellee has
no impact on its review. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in 50 W. Broadway v.
Redevelopment Agency. 784 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1989),
Furthermore, we are not bound by the trial court's classification of a finding
of fact or a conclusion of law; we will make that classification ourselves.
I d 1171.
Clearly, determining whether a party who condones the use of his land by another,
for a period of twenty or more years by an adjoining landowner, amounts to mutual
acquiescence is an ultimate question of law. Calling it a fact and asking for the clearly
erroneous standard of review is inappropriate.
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POINT III
THERE IS NO CATTLE FENCE EXCEPTION TO THE
DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE.
Appellee also argues that the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence does not apply
to this case because Utah law has created an exception to the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence for fences purportedly installed for cattle containment purposes. In fact,
paragraph 7 of the Conclusions of Law drafted by the Appellee perpetuates this error in law
by stating: "The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence or agreement does not apply in this
action."
However, in the most recent case involving cattle containment fences and the doctrine
of boundary by acquiescence which was decided by the Utah Supreme Court, Jacobs v.
Hafen, 917 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1996), the Court applied the same boundary by acquiescence
analysis that would apply to a fence or other boundary created for any other purpose. Id. at
1080. The court declined to find boundary by acquiescence in that case since the fence did
not exist for the necessary twenty year period and the court refused to find an exception to
that rule. IdLat 1081.
Babcock cites several cases for the claim that "a fence installed to control cattle
cannot create a boundary by acquiescence." (Brief ofAppellee, p.22) (emphasis in original).
Yet Babcock fails to cite any language stating such a rule. None of the cases cited state that
there is an exception for a cattle containment fence. All of these cases pre-date Staker and
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implicitly require some objective uncertainty as to the true location of the boundary. These
cases ultimately led up to the explicit adoption of objective uncertainty as an element in the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence which has been rejected in Staker. As the Court in
Staker found, requiring objective uncertainty confuses the doctrine of boundary by
agreement with the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence and effectively eliminates
boundary by acquiescence as a viable doctrine for settling property disputes in Utah. Id. at
423.
The most recent case cited by Appellee is Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d
467 (Utah 1989) which also pre-dates Staker. In Grayson, the Court did not rule on whether
a fence built to control cattle could not be acquiesced in as a boundary, rather, the Court
ruled held that there was no objective uncertainty as to the true location of the boundary and
refused to limit the requirement of objective uncertainty from Halladav v. Cluff 685 P.2d
500 (Utah 1984) to an "urban scenario/' Id.at 472.
Babcock attempts to distinguish Carter v. Hanrath, 885 P.2d 801 (Utah App. 1994)
rev'd on other grounds. 925 P.2d 960 (Utah 1996). In Carter, this Court stated that
indolence for an extended period of time was sufficient to establish mutual acquiescence.
The Supreme Court later reversed on the ground that the property in dispute was not
accessible by the owners. However, in the case at bar, there was no evidence introduced that
the property was inaccessible to the Babcocks and, as Babcock so often points out, there has
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been at least one fence constructed on the true boundary. This demonstrate that the property
has been and continues to be accessible to the Babcocks.
CONCLUSION
There is no exception to the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence for cattle fences,
rather, the standard analysis applies. The trial court has found indolence on the part of the
Babcocks and a lack of agreement between the parties or their predecessors regarding the
disputed property. Indolence, together with the other facts of this case amount to mutual
acquiescence.
DATED this JX day of July, 1999.
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